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BOOK REVIEW
THE SUPREME COURT: A QUESTION OF RELEVANCEA REVIEW OF "THE WA RREN COURT, CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM"
BY ARCHIBALD COX
Leonard V. Kaplan*
Archibald Cox has written a short, controversial and rather
comprehensive analysis of the Warren Court. The book is a blend
of legal analysis covering the "political issues" which have confronted the court, how the court did confront these issues, and
how the author agrees or disagrees with the court's judgment. An
added dimension to the analysis suggested by the book's title,
"'Constitutional Decision As An Instrument of Reform", reveals
some of the political subtlety which necessarily underlies many of
the Court's constitutional probes. The core question which presents
itself traditionally and in this analysis goes to the constant question of judicial passivity or activism. In the author's words:
"[H]ow broad a commission should the Supreme Court assume to
police the interpretation of the Constitution by the other branches
of government?" (The Warren Court at 20) In other terms, what
is the charge of the Constitutional Court in a tripartite "balanced"
system of government and how can the Court meet this charge
which actually it fixes for itself from its own reading of the Constitution and its adherence or non-adherence to past posited guidelines?
The Table of Contents adequately indicates the topic coverage
and the nature of the book itself: 1) The Basic Dilemma, 2) Civil
Rights: Judicial Innovation, 3) Civil Rights: Legislative Power,
4) The Reform of Criminal Procedure, 5) Political Democracy:
Speech and Association, 6) Political Democracy: Voting Rights and
Legislative Reapportionment. If I were to review the book in a
straight-forward manner, I would analyze the author's handling
of one or several of these issues, put his handling into a place in
the extent literature germane to that issue (s), add my personal
critical belief and end with a quote summing up the net worth of
the book so that the reader of this review would have an indication
,of whether I thought the book worth reading, and so that he would
be apprised of any weaknesses alleged by me.
* LL.B., 1965, Temple Law School; LL.M., 1966, Yale Law School; Member
of the California Bar; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska;
Presently on leave to the University of Chicago, Department of Clinical
'Pvchology.
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It seems to me that the review on the book jacket itself adequately conveys the kind of summation any potential reader needs,
and if that reader is an expert or at all knowledgeable in the Constitutional Law area, he can almost project with great accuracy
the analysis presented by Professor Cox of the Court's particular
decisions on which he has chosen to comment. In short: "Although
not uncritical of the grounds on which several of the Court's crucial decisions have been reached, Mr. Cox comes to the conclusion that the trend of the rulings has been in keeping with the
mainstream of American history-a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit humane but not sentimental, a bit idealistic but seldom
doctrinaire, and in the long run essentially pragmatic-in short, in
keeping with the true genius of our institutions." (The Warren
Court-Jacket) And indeed all the words Mr. Cox and the author
of the above blurb use on the Court are essentially applicable to
Mr. Cox's point of view itself.
This book is a series of lectures expanded for publication delivered originally in the summer of 1967 under the aegis of the Harvard
Law School and the University of Hawaii, and it would do the book
no wrong to state that the style is the type of critically sound law
review effort one would expect from an expert as powerful as
Professor Cox. And herein lies the issue that I would like to join
with Professor Cox and the Court which he describes eminently
well. The issue is one of style and style is indicative of relevancy.
And the question of relevancy presents the obvious trite ideological
rejoinder, relevant to whom?
A recurrent theme throughout the analysis is that the Warren
Court has intervened into many areas such as school segregation
only when the other branches of the government have totally failed
to act and where action was imperative in keeping with the articulated spirit of American justice-a rather vague standard. Cox approves of such intervention but would often require a better use
of nice legal tools, of esthetically pleasing arguments as taught in
the classroom, which bring a gleam (rather dull, but a gleam) to
the professional eye and a quickening of the pulse to the legal
logician; in psychoanalytical terms, the Court should cater to the
anality implicit in legal craftsmanship. In Cox's words: "There
have always been occasions when the courts, to shape the law to
these objectives, have had to pay the price of revealing that judges
sometimes make law to suit the occasion. Nor should we forget not
to pay that price may even defeat the object of obtaining voluntary
compliance, because law, to command consent, must deserve it."
(The Warren Court at 26).
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The former sentence catches much of the ambivalence Cox feels
toward the Warren Court and toward the problem of Constitutional decision-making itself. Cox has specifically acknowledged the
non-judicial power of the Court as keeper of the Nation's conscience,
(The Warren Court at 27), but still wants form, the form of legally
nice posit following legally nice posit-even though as he has indicated in the above quote, he knows the impossibility of the demand.
He wants and if on the Court (one senses he would be an activist
and perhaps a better technician than some present Court members)
would undoubtedly push for intervention much in the tradition of
the Warren Court where his perception of justice and his perception
of the commonalties of the Nation's feeling of justice of the particular issue demanded change by some governmental branch. He would
prefer the other branches to carry the ball. This is for no reason of
cowardice but to preserve and insulate the institution of the Court
from untoward and vitriolic attack. The guidelines apportioning
what Cox believes to be a case where the Court should intervene
in a non-judicial (conscience function) way are unclear, the kind
of intuitive process one gets from the reflections of such great
jurists as a Cardozo. And Cox candidly admits the insolubility of
the problem.
I have suggested strong disagreement with Professor Cox concerning style which I blended into a question of relevancy. The
issues are ones which I must confront at this point and are issues
which I think Profesor Cox either smudged or did not consider in
any way near the analytical manner in which he treats specific
case analysis in such areas as housing discrimination. (His handling
of Reitman v. Mulky (The Warren Court at 46) is masterful.) He
states: "The craftsmanship or lack of it in judicial opinions strongly
influences the judgments that lawyers pass upon the work of the
Court. Professor Richard Neustadt [he goes on to say], in writing
about the power of the President, propounded the thesis that one
of the determinants of what a President can accomplish is the
judgment of a small number of professionals upon the professional
competence of his performance. The thesis has even greater validity
as applied to the Court, for a large segment of public opinion looks
to lawyers to appraise its performance." (The Warren Court at 48).
He does candidly admit he cannot pursue his point and states his
basis for legal artistry. His proposition clearly indicates a belief
that cogency of legal reasoning developed out of principles is necessary for any continued faith in the Court's decisions--"... the
effectiveness of the Court, its very ability to slay dragons, is eroded
by any failure to show how the novel decisions required by changes
in human condition and the realization of bolder aspirations nonetheless draw their sanction from a continuity continging of prin-
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ciple." (The Warren Court at 4849). "The more rapid the pace of
social change, the faster the law must develop. But the faster pace
of legal development would seem to create still greater need for
striving to preserve, through the articulation of sound rationale,
that sense of impartiality and continuity that gives legitimacy, and
thus provide the sanction, for the judgments of a court." (The
Warren Court at 49).
The words are well articulated, the principle propounded is
seemingly obvious. I just do not know what Professor Cox means.
I do not know how his extra footnote, or force of legal articulation
will at all vary the response of the public to this commonly held
perception of justice. Nor suffice it to say, do I think that private
citizens, "the unwashed masses", "the enlightened electorate", or
what you will, really give a damn concerning the legal niceties
which titilate or inspire the legal mind. Nor do I feel that any
but the professors and perhaps a few eminent practitioners are
really swayed by the force of legal argument expressed in an
emotion frought value area. No amount of legal education could
have changed the opposition to Brown v. Board of Education, Miranda, Baker v. Carr, Reitman v. Mulkey, etc. The question of the
Court's sleight of hand ability (for this is how I posit most citizens
and most practitioners view the legal reasoning underlying significant decisions which lie in civil liberties areas) is a straw man for
the much more difficult question of the community sense of justice
and of the ability of the Court, or for that matter a legislative
decision-maker's ability, to raise or lower that commonality of
sensed justice concerning abiding issues. The large segment of the
population following George Wallace cares little for any articulation of reasons why they must sell their homes or send their children to school or work with Negroes. Nor am I (a trained lawyer
and teacher of the law) happy about a Court which cannot hear
cases concerning the legality of the war in Vietnam no matter how
the legal issue is raised. And if I am unhappy, I who am seduced by
Professor Cox's view (having spent time in legal classrooms on both
sides of the desk) what chance does the Court have of maintaining
the respect of the earnest supporters of McCarthy and the late Senator Kennedy who cannot see the Vietnam operation as anything but
an immoral and illegal conflict. Their felt sense of injustice is exacerbated by the denial of even a forum to articulate their view on
the only level of the judiciary that has pertinency, the Supreme
Court. Nothing less will do, so Supreme has the Court become. We
have been led to expect too much from the Warren Court-an ironic
state of affairs-and now sizable portions of the population want no
less than justice-no legal quibbling and not denials of certiorariwhich we lawyers assure them are only procedural and bear no rela-
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tionship to the Court's substantively held perception of the particular issue. And of these sizable portions of the country demanding
justice-there is very little basis for compromise. The shared sense
of equality is not so shared or at all understood by the white middle class or the whites of Appalachia, let alone the blacks of Chicago or Watts and the prototypical and much abused Alaba-an
whose faith is placed in their deft Mr. Wallace-a true friend of
an unrepresented class-a class who want to hold their economic
gains but feel a fear towards blacks, big government, toward
"them", they feel, just like the ghetto black, a need for manhoodfor dignity.
And why does the Court refuse to hear cases concerning the
legality of the war in Vietnam? Professor Cox gives us no answer.
He states: "If those rules [on standing to sue] are applied, there
may never be a Supreme Court ruling upon the constitutionality
of the grants [to parochial schools], just as there probably can be
none (albeit for a different reason) upon whether fighting a war
in Vietnam without a declaration of war by Congress violates the
Constitution." (The Warren Court at 19) (emphasis added).
I can speculate certainly why the Court refuses to hear Vietnam
cases and the reasoning is easy and justified if, and only if, the
institution of the Supreme Court is more important than the ideals
propounded by the very vitality and strength of the Warren Court.
In short, if the Court hears cases concerning the war's legality, an
answer affirming the war as legal will in no sense affirm any sense
of justice by a great number of Americans who are certain of the
immorality of the war; these laymen equate immortality with
illegality. They are not sophisticated lawyers nor are they sophists.
(One should remember the advent of separation of issues of morality from "positive" law in Nazi Germany as a tendency toward
arbitrary law, toward non-law: the issue is much more complex
with a wealth of rich literature but the literature is not available
nor would it in any way persuade the layman who understands
Soloman's wisdom, not artful distinctions of lesser mortals.) If the
Court held the war illegal: 1) the executive very probably would
ignore such a ruling, 2) as a subset of 1) the Court would be trespassing on the authority of an independent branch who need not
respond, 3) those citizens, relatives and friends who lost those close
to them in the war would be enraged, by the imputation that the
loss was for nothing, either against the Court itself or against the
government as a whole-an obnoxiously serious undermining of an
already weakened credibility projected by the government.
The Court seems to feel that non-action will preserve institutions of justice against these speculated objections. Perhaps so
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But certainly perhaps the Court by avoidance will render itself
irrelevant to the truly significant legal questions (i.e., questions
which can meet that form necessary for Constitutional decisionmaking as "case or controversy" etc. which continually confront
it). The Court will be attacked not only by the establishment, e.g.,
against Mr. Justice Fortas, representing the Warren Court, but also
by those from whom the Court expects its succor-who have
greater expectation and needs engendered by the Court's past high
standards (or believed high standards).
There is one other issue broached and I think fobbed off by
Professor Cox which demands explanation, i.e., "civil disobedience"
or "civil dissonance" (a more modern form). Professor Cox traces
the concept back to our noble freedom fighter in the South-the
marchers, set-inners, all of those who knew as we all know that the
South had "unconstitutional laws". Cox states: "So long as civil
rights demonstrators were violating unconstitutional Jim Crow
laws, as in the freedom rides and possibly in the lunch counter sitins-so long as the restrictions upon marches and picketing were
imposed under local ordinances void for vagueness or the excessive delegation of censorial power-the challenge to established
local authority was only a superficial form of civil disobedience.
One may disregard with legal impunity the commands of civil
authorities (but not of a court) if what the authorities forbid is in
truth only the exercise of a privilege guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. Such action involves no civil disobedience-no
violation of law in the ultimate sense-because the only orders
that are violated, being unconstitutional,are not law. There is no
constitutionalright of civil disobedience to an otherwise valid law."
(The Warren Court at 112) (emphasis added) Professor Cox goes on
to state that the only true civil disobedience in the South was on
the part of Governors Wallace and Barnett who refused to desegregate schools despite court rulings. The key, to Professor Cox,
is revealed in these words: "Similarly, I can recall no instance in
which civil rights demonstrators used the sheer weight of numbers 'non-violently' to obstruct the lawful activities of others,
to suppress argument, or in an effort to impose their views upon
the community by sheer harassment." (The Warren Court at 113)
The key to Professor Cox is obviously one of style! I cannot see
how he can state that the freedom marchers et. al. in the South
knew of the unconstitutionality of Jim Crow laws a priori any
more than protestors against the Vietnam war who feel the principles of Nuremberg applicable a priori feel that war unconstitutional. If the freedom marchers are absolved because they are not
truly civil disobeyers neither are the war protestors civil disobeyers or those who "civilly disobey" on a myriad of issues they
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feel a priori to be unconstitutional. Professor Cox's view is the kind
of sophistry which can only hold the Court and the law up to the
scorn of the feeling laymen. But the issue is not so simple, the
logic of the Cox position is forced because he feels: "The man
who is willing to deny the force of law, in order to impose his views
upon society must be peculiarly arrogant or extremely shortsighted." (The Warren Court at 113) I resent this statement deeply.
The Bill of Rights was designed to protect many who would assert
their rights over society and the Supreme Court in its checkered
career has not always been so cognizant of those explicit rights.
Were those men who advocated a right guaranteed by the Constitution as they read it, but not "read into" the Constitution until a
later era or not at all, arrogant or shortsighted? Were all the minority dissenters, the Holmes, the early Harlan, the Brandeis so arrogant because they violently agreed with many unconstitutional
actors? And certainly Jesus Christ would be made arrogant indeed
by the arrogantly stated proposition of Professor Cox. And most
arrogant of all was the international tribunal at Neurenberg which
tried and convicted citizens of one nation for concordance with the
enforced societal expectations of that nation. No, Professor Cox,
no indeed. The man who willingly denies the force of law might
be most humble, most foresighted and most right indeed for himself
and for his country. He is no enemy of the people.
But I commiserate because Professor Cox does not want to,
impute bad to the "good workers" in the South who were gentlefolk and whom we liberals like and would count in our company
if we had their guts. But the long haired "arrogant" youth who is
so ill graced as to throw himself in front of a troop train is interferring with private property, is too violent for us, despite his good
faith, despite his intentionality or our perception of his intentionality. The long haired youth cause trouble, stop processes, seek confrontation. They are ill-mannered, they smell bad, they are often
arrogant, and they are often right, and they are out practicing
the principles they have learned from us and from our recognition
of good civil disobedience. They are perplexed by "bad" civil disobedience. And they should be if they paid attention only to the
principles of constitutional law as Professor Cox advocates by
stressing legal cogency. The issue is style. Neither the society, nor
the majority of the Court likes their style, it is dangerous, as presaged from down South. We have new and finely honed sensibilities in youth and they brook of no compromise on justice-a
justice we, I again stress, taught them. Lock them up if you will
but do not pretend to distinguish their case from those who marched
for freedom on an a priori belief of rectitude. That would be dene-
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grating the standards of legal esthetics I learned in law school.
Better say like Vietnam, the Court cannot handle the issue because
of the politics of the situation.
If the Court cannot really handle Vietnam issues, or civil disobedience issues, perhaps it is no longer relevant as an institution
of justice, which has pre-empted onto itself the role of nation's
conscience. Perhaps the Court is no longer relevant to issues concerning significant questions of justice where there is no consensus
of perception of justice in regard to these issues in the society itself.
Then the Court should perhaps reduce its role to one of a lesser
level aspiration.
But certainly the Warren Court has accomplished much, so
much as to create the expectation for more than it can deliver as
I have suggested throughout this review. Professor Cox indicates
the impact the Court has had in the criminal procedure area. And,
in fact, the Court has made great symbolic attempts to restructure
criminal procedure more in consonance with individual dignity
embodied in the essence (again a rather hazy term) of the Constitution. But I suspect all the "Miranda" cases have very little and
very low impact on actual police practice; the real impact of these
reforms is like Brown v. Board of Education and similar cases a
balm to sorely tried liberal consciences. Schools are not desegregated nor do all alleged criminals get their constitutional rights
as articulated by the Court. The standards promulgated by the
Warren Court are important to a few to whom they directly pertain
and who because of effective counsel or some fortuity are granted
these rights. It is romantic and prestigious to write of the Supreme
Court; the real job of analysis and dispensation of justice is in Federal District Courts and more particularly in local common pleas
courts. Judicial justice perhaps can be meted out in cases involving
no political issues, and there may be few issues now confronting
this society that are not broadly based politically.
I do not enjoy even suggesting the possibility of the Supreme
Court's irrelevance to the real issues of the day; e.g., Vietnam, race
relations, poverty. It would perhaps be better to admit this irrelevance and look for other institutional means of justice dispensation or else self-help (often a perfectly fine legal answer and certainly psychologically satisfying) which will necessarily have to
suffice and fail.
Despite the fact that Warren still sits as Chief Justice-the era
of his Court and its hardships and triumphs have, it seems, ended.
Cox indicates in his last sentence "Etihat the institution of constitutional adjudication works so well on the whole is testimony not
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only to the genius of the institution but to the wisdom and courage
of the individual justices." (The Warren Court at 134). I obviously
do not feel the Court is working so well as an institution. I feel it
will work less well in the immediate future and can only hope for
a rehabilitation and reemergence as an institution capable of dispensing and acting with justice. But this is not a function of the
Court; rather the Court is a function of a pluralistic society which
is in increasing danger, and the court as an institution of that society
reflects the types of confrontations that are increasingly occurring.
The eminent sociologist, C. Wright Mills, has referred to the law as
a middle class power, and I fear he is right. The law can help to
keep the peace, maintain tranquility etc., but first the condition for
that tranquility must be in the society, and this means the type
of economic and psychological reform that abounds in all the new
paperbacks but nowhere in the Halls of Congress, and, I fear, little
in the heart of the people.
Cox is fine with cases: his criticisms are justified generally and
well taken, he has done justice to the Warren Court which has
done its best to give justice to us. It is now beyond the parameters
of the institution that seems to maintain that expectation. Professor
Cox indicates that the Court is not a Council of Wise Men, but
perhaps that is what is now necessary for the Court to carry on.
(The Warren Court at 22). But I fail to see how Wise Men can do
what the Court cannot, nor do I feel faith in such philosopher-kings.
The image is important though, its mention as a literary device
could ironically presage what will happen with the Court and our
other governmental branches. But I doubt that these "Wise Men"
will be so benevolent. They will be, if they materialize, repressiveto be fought by Professor Cox and then I hope to be in his number.
At this point Professor Cox is not "where it is at" nor am I. I hope
we can both continue to publish in law reviews and publish manuscripts no matter how irrelevant they may be and still keep our
ethical stances in tact. Let us learn from the great psychoanalyst
Bruno Beittehein who described the Nazi atrocities and the head
hiding of its victims in his The Informed Heart and let us keep our
metaphysical hearts as well as our hard legal heads informed.

